It is generally agreed that scientific research yields its richest rewards to those investigators who take the pains, in advance of actual experiment, to review carefully the question to which they propose to address themselves and to phrase their queries in a strict and meaningful way. To random questions nature returns random answers; only when we know dearly and rationally what we are asking, have we placed ourselves in a field wherein an unambiguous and final answer is possible. For this reason the preliminary construction of a very careful hypothesis becomes of high importance in scientific research.
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But there is a corollary to the above remarks which in practice is frequently disregarded, although mere lip-service is paid to it on all sides. This corollary is the matter of rigorous terminology, in the absence of which it becomes impossible to construct hypotheses carefully and accurately; and the use of a rgorous .termnology in turn presupposes the employment of rigorous definition.
If Smith and Jones use the same label for different concepts, the cooperation essential to successful scientific work is lost, not deliberately but by default. And if the label a sometimes means the concept A, sometimes the concept B, the sane result ensues.
Rigorous terminology is not an academic luxury; it is a bed-rock necessity of scientific success.
If put in sufficiently general ways we shall find little objection to the above ideas. But when we become specfic, we meet a different situation. And specifically, in the Whole field of psychology and to a lesser but increasing extent in the biological fields, we find a prevalent misuse and misapplication of the basic term, normal. That resulits in loose condusions; loose condusions bring the acceptance of half-truths and of self-defeating misinterpretations. It seems evident that no science can survive indefintely under this sort of concealed attack.
The lmisuse of the term, normal, in a sense synonymous with "Caverage"l or "ordinary" is a case in point, for no such identity exists. The average may be, and very often is, abnormal. The normal, on the other hand, is objectively, and properly, to be defined as that which functions in accordance with its design. Design and function are inseparably correlated in nature-even when one or the other factor happens to be unknown to us-and the term, normal, was originally invented and employed in recognition of that relationship.
The medical profession remains in general unconfused about the distinction. For its specialized purposes it still considers the term, abnormal, to be roughly synonymous with unhealthy or diseased. It believes cancer, for example, to be a disease and those Who suffer from cancer to be in an abnormal organic condition. And it would continue to hold these beliefs, even if the population of the entire planet should succumb to cancer. Averages, from the medical point of view, do not define the normal state of health; it is the absence of malfunction which does so.
In just the same way-and in any field dealing with human beings-those men must be estimated as normal or abnormal who are so in terms of the organism to which the adjective applies, i.e., in terms of the human organism. A million cripples do not, by their mere numnber, acquire soundness nor does the presence of a majority of lunatics in a given population make insanity norrnal, as any director of a lunatic asylum will testify.
We London, 1931; pp. 437, 434. To such views it is often objected that they are abstract and theoretical, that what confronts us in practical fact is the necessity of forming some specific concept of the normal from tihe tabulation of actual averages. But surely this last assertion can be denied. If certain workers have constructed what they believe to be a norm by the laborious process of tabulatii;g averages, they are simply mistaken in their choice of words; when you take an average, you take an average and there can seem to ibe little justification for calling it something else. Even if the misuse is employed by a statistician, reasoning ifrom medians rather than averages, the situation remains the same.
There is a way to deduce norms but it depends upon the examination of design rather tihan the tabulation of averages, based upon no matter how numerous a population.
If, from a colleotion of damaged bombsights, broken and partially destroyed in crashes and forced landings, the Germans have been able to discover the pattern and principle of the workable Norden instrument, then equally from a sufficient number of human biological specimens, even though none of them be perfect, we can come to valid conclusions, not only concerning the more or less abnormal average, but also in regard to the indicated norm froim which each speimen manifests a particular departure.
We know, for example, that myelinization is essential to function in some nerve tracts; we also know that in many human beings myelinization within the frontal lobe, especially of the frontothalamic tract, is either partially or wholly deficient. How do we know this, since all we see are the deficient "many human beings"? We know it first because we learn about myelinization, next because we find it lacking in a given specimen, and finally because we explain the abnormality or malfunction of that specimen by the absence of myelinization. This may not be formal, mathema-tical logic of the Boelean type (in fact, it certainly isn't) but it is the sort of operational logic which research scientists employ and by means of which research progresses. Our explanation of the discrepancy shows it to be a measure of the specimen's departure from the normal, it does not at all show that the discrepancy is an evidence of the nature of the normal.
If this type of inductive reasoning from the particular to the general were really inadequate no manufacturer could ever find out his competitor's formula from an analysis of the competitor's product nor would we salvage the wrecked equipment of our enemies in order to discover their latest means of attacking us.
But in psychological matters the procedure is too often turned about. There are those who despair of discovering fundamental human design through a direct consideration of the apposite data and hope to come upon it more easily by observing a sufficiendy numerous and otherwise "fair" sample of specimens. Can we not see that any such plan is doomed to failure by its inherent contradictions? That when we continue to add individual abnormalities, they will not canoel each other out but merely present to us a cumulative index of abnormality? And that falsely to call the cumulation of abnormnality a "norm" is only to bewitch and to bewilder ourselves unmercifully?
Let us investigate the epistemological objection to our position a little more closely. Let us take a simple example. If we come across a broken wheel, it is possible legitimately to infer, in general to discover, not only the inherent function of the object but in addition what is wrong (abnormal) about it. This is possible because in every phenomenon design is an inherent element (quite irrespective of any implication as to designer). In the wheel the essence of design is circularity including the presence of an axis, whether or not specifically evidenced by tihe presence of a hulb. The function potentially associated with circularity in a discrete dbject is revolution. We need not go into the diverse uses to which this function may be put, e.g., when the wheel is incorporated into a wagon, a belt-onveyor, a watch, or other mechanisms; the simplest point is that circularity of form and revolution of movement are associated as the constitutional and functional aspects of the same thing.
The epistemological objection consists in asserting that we can only recognize the function of the wheel because of past experience with other wheels and thus that in the end it comes down to a question of averages, after all. But it is difficult to understand how, in such a case, we can recognize a broken wheel the first time we see one. On the epistemological argument we should have to conclude that we confront, not a broken wheel, but an entirely novel object of unaccustomed design and unknown function. We are, in fact, under no such disability, we conclude quite properly that the preponderant design shows us a wheel and that the local departure from design, also manifested, Which prevents the fulfillment of the wheel's natural function, is to be accounted for by the circumstance that the wheel has been broken. In no other way can we reach such concepts as that of "broken wheel"; mere experience, no matter how often repeated, cannot supply us with recognition of "broken wheel" the first time we see one.
Do we, then, never accomplish this feat? Are we always told, do we never discover? The writer is of opinion that a good many children, confronted originally by a broken wheel, have worked out its character by themselves long before being told. However, we need not rely upon opinion. It is obvious -that, on the basis of this cobjection, the first wheel could never have been either recognized or invented. We know, however, that it was.
The constitutional-functional complex is not, in truth, a matter connected with averages or, primarily, with repetitive experience.
Let us turn now to the mathematical grounds for the misuse of the term, normal. In that branch of mathematical computation known as statistics there has grown up the custom of using the label, norm, and the alternative adjective, normal, as referring to a quantity or imeasurement which is representative or typical of a given class of dlata. Now there is a way in which this use of the terms is legitimate and there are also circumstances which sometimes render such use altogether illegitimate; but unfortunately the statistician fails to entertain the distinction and frequently he embraces the illegitimate side of the procedure.
If the concept to which the term is related is such that it corresponds to the standard pattern to which the dass of which it is a menmber conforms, then the use of norm or of normal is justified. But if the concept is merely such that it corresponds to a majority of other cases belonging to the class (any of which might as easily have been taken as the one which was in fact taken), then we have no assurance either that the one which was taken or that the others Which might have been taken, do actually confonn to such standard pattern. In the latter case the use of norm is unjustified. It is not sufficient to re-define norm or normal as that which is typical of any class of data; it must be added that this is true only where the class of data under consideration has itself already been determined as conforming to its own inherent design or standard. In other words mathematical computation can never take the place of empirical ascertainment and the assumption that by a faulty use of terms it can be made to do so, lies at the (base of a sometimes fallacious employment of statistical methods. What is in fact normal can never be ascertained simply by the use of any mathematical tool, because its essential dependence is upon qualitative considerations, and mathematics deals with quantitative data.
Such is one of the origins of the mathematical misuse of normal but there is another origin also, this time deriving from the theory of prcbabilities. Probability, as employed mathematically, is only a dignified way of writing "ignorance." It is when we have no grounds at all upon which to base an assumption tthat we have recourse to prdbabilities. And here the basic assumption is made that the chances of various occurrences (as to which chances we know nothing) are equal. That assumption seems neither more nor less rational than any other oif a vast number of assumptions that the chances are in one or another way unequal. Empirically it is not as rational, for it always turns out empirically that the chances never are equal. The dassic example is the tossing of coins and never yet has it been found that the result is first heads, then tails, and so on indefinitely. The more you toss, the doser they add up to equal occurrences; lbut they do so by runs and this, if it suggests anything, seems to show, not that the chances are ever equal, buit that over sufficient periods of time the chances are alternately unequal in different senses. It is certainly no reason at all for the assumption that a position at the bulging middle of a "normal" probability curve is more normal than one at either of its tapering ends. It can only be said that a middle posi'tion is more typical of the data under consideration but it tells us nothing as to the normality or abnormality of the data. If the data be abnormal-and this is a question inaccessible to any mathematical technic-then the more typical the instance, the closer it corresponds to the particular abnormality represented by the class of which it is a member.
In psychology the employment of statistical methods has bloomed mightily in recent years and, in the main, this is an excellent devellopment, for these methods can 'be powerful tools of analysis when legitimately used. But the tendency to indulge in their illegitimate use has seemed to be an easy substitute for the harder task of empirical ascertainment and from that attitude has arisen the fallacious and decep'tive misuse of norm and normal in the psychologically mistaken sense of typical or average. Now we come to another, equally strong argument for the insistence upon the contrasted significance of t'he two terms, normal and average, a significance originally clear in our vocabulary. The synonyms of "average" are everywhere listed as mean, medium, generality, compromise; those -of "normal" as norm, design, pattern, model, prototype, standard, paradigm. It seems hardly possible for anyone to be confused regarding the contrast between the two lists, and when we trace the derivation of the two terms, it seems even less possible. "Normal" comes from the Latin norma, which means a "rule" or "pattern" and was originally derived from the name of a mason's tool, a square by means of which his work and his designs were standardized. "Average" is derived from two Latin words, the preposition, ad, and the noun, verum, the combination signifying "toward the truth" or "approaching the truth," thus an "approximation." Since it is evident that for anything to approach the truth, there must be a prior truth or standard for it to approach, the distinction and the proper use of the two terms are plain.
It is also plain that the original justification for the coinage of the two ikvbels was that they referred to two entirely different concepts. This matter of terminology gains its importance from the fact that terms denote concepts. And when we have identified "normal" with "average" and also have failed to replace the label, norm.al, with another term denoting its original significance, we have dropped from our vocabulary-and from our thinking-a concept vital to the understanding of many problems and certainly to that both of psychological and biological problems. The question as to the discovery or recognition of a given standard or norm is an empirical problem, not a logical one, and simply does not enter into the necessary terminological distinction. On the other hand he would be a very strict empiricist who maintained that science could safely dispense with liogical considerations.
The empirical problem of the discovery of the normal in respect to human beings is, of course, of the very highest importance, since that discovery must furnish not only our standard of rational comparison but likewise our standard of evaluation of all psychological research in any basic sense. Its importance, indeed, is so great that not a few workers unconsciously manifest the false modesty of proclaiming its solution beyond their efforts or even their attempts. It is premature to face this problem seriously, they say.
A simple question, it would seem, disposes of that position: when will it Tbe time to do so? And since all our findings must be evaluated eventually in terms of the answer to the problem of the essen-tially normal, it would appear that it is most of our present undertakings which are actually premature, surely not the attempt to discover the standard by which they must be judged.
But sometimes the reply is that we must await further advances by biology. Or by physiology. Or by neurology. Or by some other branch of science. However, it does not seem to be the paucity of data which is to blame, it seems to be the refusal to correlate the availaible data in a psychological sense with the problem of the human norm. The place to begin the attack is apparent, as is also a superabundance of available data when compared to the efforts made to utilize them.
A rigorous termin-ology is a required preliminary in approaching the problem and we propose to use normal and average as distinguishable contrasts and to define them as follows:
"average"-that which results from mathematical computation based upon more than one sample, i.e., a specimen mean, "normal"-that which functions in accordance with its inherent design, i.e., a pattern norm.
But none of this will alter the current misuse of the term, normal, nor will it suddenly disestalblish the long habits and associations of its misemployment, now hardened into scientific and even popular vocabulary. We therefore propose to embrace an alternative mentioned earlier and to replace the label, normal, with another term denoting the original significance of normal. The term will be "paradic," -from paradigm, one of the synonyms of normal. Paradic will be employed as meaning solely: that which functions in accordance with its inherent design.
So far this is mere definition -but now we must advance to a more unorthodox position. For we intend to assert a direct, but largely unremarked, implication of biology, viz., that the organic design of the human being is the one complete design of its kind existing within the entire organic kingdom on this planet. The detailed arguments on whieh the statement rests are too lengthy for present reproduction but it is felt that almost any 'biologist must agree with them upon reflection. They are based not only upon structural considerations but on functional ones as well; no other creature behaviorally manifests the integration of intellectual, affective, and sensorimotor response which characterizes man or, if any do, then by no means to the same degree of completeness. Thus the human design represents the complete and fundamental organic pattern, from which other species depart by one degree or another, and the basic paradic of the organic kingdom is the anthroparadic.
It makes little difference whether we approach the question from the side of structure or of function. It will not surprise us that that organism which manifests the most complexly integrated activities in its behavior should also possess the most highly complex and complete integrating organ, viz., the central nervous system. On the ground of highest coordination and of most diverse activities coordinaited, man is the standard against which all other organisms must be measured, because objectively other organisms are either less diverse or less coordinated in activity. The same is true of morphological design. On the basis of completeness the anthroparadic must be the ultimate paradic of the whole organic kingdom.
What, then, is the anthroparadic? At the end we confront this fascinating and basic question, with the preliminary necessity of rigorous definition, rigorous concept, and nrgorous terminology as the first essential.
